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• The effects of the ratio between taxes and social provision on population well-being for ten European countries.
• We use a panel cointegration analysis.
• We control for the 2008 financial crisis.
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a b s t r a c t
This paper has analyzed the effects of the ratio between taxes and social provision on population well-
being for ten European countries. The linkages between what citizens would expect in return of the taxes
paid and their well-being have clearly become stronger after the crisis and it should be taken into account
in the debate on public policies and how these translates in population well-being.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
There is emerging consensus that happiness surveys can
provide an important complementary tool for public policy. The
appetite to enhance well-being is being used ever more often
in driving policy makers decisions. The World Happiness Report
(Helliwell et al., 2012) suggests that the transition from the GDP to
the well-being era has well started.
In the literature on the use of aggregate happiness as a guide-
line for economic policy, two general perspectives prevail. The first
one incorporates the insights of the economics of happiness di-
rectly into public policy, using the cost–benefit analysis traditional
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0/).framework (Layard, 2006). This perspective, as Stutzer and Frey
(2014) underline, enables one to derive optimal policies in a nu-
merical way; it gives a measure of social welfare based on hap-
piness data. In sharp contrast to postulating a purely theoretical
social welfare function at aggregate level based on a wide range of
different micro/macro variables, the well-being figures provided
by population feedbacks on happiness do look at informations
based on individual’s judgments. The second perspective, by Frey
and Stutzer (2012), is based on the insights of the public choice
theory. Their vision is focused on the fundamental hypothesis that
the quality of the political process is the key to people’s happiness.
In their perspective the results gained from happiness research
should be taken as inputs into the democratic political process.
Di Tella et al. (2001), among others, investigated empirically the
role of business cycles as a key determinant of happiness, and to
what extent a welfare state can help to mitigate the costs of these
business cycle fluctuations. Pacek and Radcliff (2008) and Haller
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and unequivocally, to human well-being.
The dynamic link between taxes and social provision on one
side, and national happiness on the other, has not been fully
established. Yet, it is argued that the direction and strength of
this relationship depend mainly on economic performances. In
this paper, we move one step forward in that direction. We
examine whether happiness is influenced by the percentage of
taxes returned to population in the form of social provision. We
use a variable to proxy the ‘‘value for money’’, or share of welfare,
offered to tax payers in return of taxes paid. Furthermore, the
second novel contribution is to analyze whether the sensitiveness
of happiness to the social expenditure–tax ratio is strengthen, or
not, by the 2008 financial crisis. We take a completely agnostic
approach, and we are mainly interested in measuring the ability
of our ‘‘value for money’’ indicator to translate into happiness.
Within a panel data framework, the paper focuses on ten European
countries. The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines
the econometric model, describes the data and presents the
empirical findings. Section 3 summarizes the main findings and
offers some concluding remarks.
2. The model and empirical results
The dependent variable used in the empirical analysis is the
Happiness Index collected yearly from Veenhoven (1993). The in-
dex is based on a survey question such as ‘How satisfied are you
with the life you live?’ with answers ranked from 1 (no satisfied)
to 4 (very satisfied), transformed by Veenhoven in a range from 0
to 10.1 Furthermore, we use as explicative variable the percentage
of taxes returned back to citizens in the form of social benefits, de-
fined as ‘Value for Money’ (henceforth VfM). The positive relation-
ship between welfare state and human well-being, stated in the
literature by Pacek and Radcliff (2008) and Haller and Hadler
(2006), motivates the choice of VfM as a potential determinant
of happiness. Since it is a money’s worth measure, we believe it
can provide further guidance to policy makers about redistribu-
tion policies and their effects on the aggregate level of happiness.
Specifically, VfM is the ratio between public social expenditure and
total tax revenue per capita. Public social expenditure2 is the pro-
vision by public institutions of benefits to, and financial contribu-
tions targeted at, households and individuals in order to provide
support during circumstanceswhich adversely affect theirwelfare,
provided that the provision of the benefits and financial contribu-
tions constitutes neither a direct payment for a particular good or
service nor an individual contract or transfer. Such benefits can be
either in the form of cash transfers, or by direct (‘‘in-kind’’) pro-
vision of goods and services. Total tax revenue, instead, is defined
as compulsory, unrequited payments to general government. They
are unrequited in the sense that benefits provided by government
to taxpayers are not normally in proportion to their payments. The
data on total tax revenue shown here refer to the revenues col-
lected from taxes on income and profits, social security contri-
butions, taxes levied on goods and services, payroll taxes, on the
ownership and transfer of property, and other taxes. Data and def-
inition were sourced by the OECD database. The rate of unemploy-
ment, usually considered to be one of the main determinants of
happiness, is also included and sourced by the International Mon-
etary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database. Furthermore, in
1 If questions were essentially equivalent, a standardization process run by
experts was allowed. Hence, these indices, by countries, are homogenized through
the expert-transformation methodology (see Veenhoven, 1993, chapter 7).
2 Devoted to health, old age, survivors, incapacity related, active andpassive labor
policies, family and housing.order to account for the possible effects of the recent sovereign
debt crisis, we include a dummy variable with a switch on 2008,
i.e. on the year in which Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy.
Therefore, dummyvariables are associated to the constant (tomea-
sure possible shift in the Happiness Index) and to the Value for
Money and Unemployment variables in order to investigate and
test the effects of the crisis on the dynamics linking the social
spending/tax ratios and unemployment, and happiness. We use
yearly data for the following countries: Belgium, Denmark, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain
over the period 1980–2011 for a total of 300 observations. The
empirical investigation consists of a panel cointegration analysis,
aimed to disentangle the long vs short run relationship among the
Happiness Index and its determinants.3
Preliminary analysis, using Breusch–Pagan LM test and modi-
fiedWald test for group-wise heteroskedasticity and cross-section
independence, reject the null hypothesis (Table 1, Panel A). There-
fore, we apply the second-generation tests of panel unit root (CADF
by Pesaran, 2007) and cointegration (Westerlund, 2007). The for-
mer test concerns the existence of cross-sectional dependences,
depending on whether unit root tests allow for potential corre-
lations across residuals of panel units, while the latter test have
good small-sample properties and high power compared to other
popular tests like Pedroni (2004). Moreover, bootstrap p-values
are computed under very general forms of cross-sectional depen-
dence.4 The null hypothesis of no cointegration has been tested by
means of group-mean tests (Ga,Gt ) and panel tests (Pa, Pt ). The
null hypotheses of no cointegration are rejected by all four tests
(Table 1, Panel C).
After having highlighted the presence of cointegration, we
proceed with the estimation of our panel model. The use of the
Pooled Mean Group estimation (PMG) allows for the identification
of the long-run equilibrium relationship (cointegration) amongst
the variables of interest, taking into account for country specific
effects. The PMG estimates a common long-run relationship across
countries but still allowing for unrestricted country heterogeneity
in the adjustment dynamics and fixed effects.5
Following Blackburne and Frank (2007), we assume an autore-
gressive distributive lag (ARDL) (p, q) dynamic panel specification
of the following form:
Hi,t = αi + Dαi +
p
j=1
λi,jHi,t−j
+
q
j=0

βi,j + Di,j

Xi,t−j + εi,t (1)
where Hi,t is the aggregate level of happiness in country i at
time t , αi is the country specific effect, Dαi is a dummy variable
3 Although bounded integer-valued random variables, such as the Happiness
Index, cannot be integrated in the usual sense, see the discussion in Granger
(2010), in many theoretical and applied studies they are modeled as I(1) processes.
Cavaliere (2005) and Cavaliere and Xu (2014) are the only attempts to explain how
the concept of I(1) can coexist with the constraints of a bounded process. They
show that in the presence of (one or two) bounds, unit root tests based on standard
asymptotic critical values become over-sized. As far as our analysis is concerned,we
feel that in light of Cavaliere (2005) and Cavaliere andXu (2014)’s findings (unit root
tests based on standard asymptotic critical values become over-sized), not rejecting
the null hypothesis further strengths our findings.
4 Since in small sample, as in this study,Westerlund (2007)warns that the results
of the tests could be sensitive to the choice of the lag and lead lengths, we keep
them equal to one. The p-values are for a one-sided test based on 800 bootstrap
replications.
5 Please note that as a robustness check, unit root as well as cointegration
analyses, on individual series, were also performed controlling for the presence
of structural breaks. Results, not reported for space constraints and available from
the authors upon request, suggest the presence of unit root in all variables under
consideration and a long run equilibrium among the Happiness Index and its
determinants.
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Panel cointegration estimation.
Panel A. Cross-section independence
Test Test statistics

χ2

p-value
Breusch–Pagan LM test 88.588 0.000
Modified Wald test 68.22 0.000
Panel B. Panel unit root tests—CADF
Variables Test statistics (Z[t-bar]) p-value
Hi,t −0.242 0.404
VfM i,t −0.699 0.242
Ui,t −0.626 0.734
1Hi,t −10.253*** 0.000
∆VfM i,t −3.246*** 0.001
1Ui,t −3.233*** 0.001
Panel C. Westerlund ECM panel cointegration test
Test statistics p-value
Gt −1.964** 0.021
Ga −1.424*** 0.000
Pt −2.946** 0.015
Pa −4.096*** 0.000
Panel D. Panel cointegration results
Parameters Long-run coefficients Parameters Short-run coefficients
αi 3.240
(0.628)
*** αi 3.763
(0.335)
***
Dαi 0.340
(0.095)
*** ∆VfM i,t−1 0.057
(0.055)
VfM i,t−1 0.171
(0.054)
*** ∆DVfM i,t−1 3.773
(1.579)
**
Ui,t−1 −0.022
(0.006)
*** 1Ui,t−1 −0.034
(0.0109)
***
DUi,t −0.139
(0.079)
* 1DUi,t−1 −0.114
(0.153)
ωi −0.453
(0.076)
***
Observations 290 290
Number of countries 10 10
Note: The Westerlund (2007) test assume no cointegration as the null hypothesis. Robust p-values are for
a one-sided test based on 800 bootstrap replications.
* Reject the null at 10%.
** Reject the null at 5%.
*** Reject the null at 1%.associated to the constant and Xi,t is the vector of four explanatory
variables namely, (i) VfM i,t is the ‘Value for Money’; (ii) Ui,t
is unemployment; (iii) DVfM i,t and (iv) DUi,t are two dummy
variables (corresponding to the 2008 global financial crisis)
associated to value for money and unemployment, respectively.
The aim is to investigate the long-run equilibrium between Hi,t
and Xi,t along with the short-run dynamics and deviation from the
equilibrium. The estimation of the short-run coefficients, speed of
adjustment, country-specific intercepts, and country-specific error
variances are performed on a country-by-country basis. Hence, it
is common to reparameterize (Eq. (1)) into the following error
correction representation:
1Hi,t = αi +
p−1
j=1
λi,j1Hi,t−1 +
q−1
j=0

βi,j + Di,j

1Xi,t−j
+ωi(εi,t−1)+ µit (2)
where ∆ is the first difference operator, ωi is the country-specific
error correction speed of adjustment term, λi,j and βi,j are the
coefficients of the lagged variables,αi is the country specific effect,6
6 Pesaran et al. (1999, 2001) justify the use of a common long-run slope
coefficient on the following ground: ‘‘there are often good reasons to expect
the long-run equilibrium relationship between variables to be similar across
groups/countries. . . ’’. This statement applies well to our group of countries, all
belonging to the European Union and nine out of ten to the European Monetary
Union.Di,j is a dummy variable associated to the constant and µit is the
disturbances term. The existence of a meaningful long-run effect
with a stable adjustment dynamics requires ωi < 0. The results
are presented in Table 1 (Panel D). The economic theory would
suggest the level of happiness being positively related to changes
in the portion of tax returned to citizens in the form of social
spending. Consistent with the recent literature, we also control for
unemployment that is expected to have a negative impact.
Our results can be summarized as follows. There is a long-
run equilibrium between happiness and ‘Value for Money’
and unemployment with associated weights being statistically
significant and with a positive (0.171) and a negative (−0.022)
sign, respectively. There is no evidence of changes in the long run
relationship following the recent financial crisis.
The error correction term (Eq. (2)) is negative and highly
significant (ω = −0.453) suggesting cointegration among the
variables and showing a rather fast speed of adjustment towards
the equilibrium. Looking at the short run relationship we observe
that while the VfM variable is not significant before the crisis, it
becomes significant after the crisis (3.773). As for unemployment,
the opposite pattern emerges with a negative and significant effect
(−0.034) on happiness before the crisis only.
3. Conclusions
This paper has analyzed the effects of the ratio between taxes
and social provision on the Happiness Index for ten European
M. Albanese et al. / Economics Letters 135 (2015) 100–103 103countries using yearly data for the period 1980–2011. It uses,
unlike previous studies, the ratio between taxes and social
provision as a proxy for population share of welfare. The results
can be summarized as follows. We found strong evidences of a
relationship between social–tax ratio and happiness. Moreover,
our findings suggest the important informations captured by the
social–tax ratio variable in determining the Happiness Index. Of
particular interest is the finding that the latter has become highly
responsive to the former during the recent crisis. The linkages
betweenwhat citizenswould expect in return of the taxes paid and
their well-being have clearly become stronger after the crisis and
it should be taken into account in the debate on public policies and
how these are perceived by tax-payers.
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